The delicate problems that some financial institutions have been experiencing since the beginning of March 2023 cast doubt on whether any lessons were learned from the 2008 financial crisis. At that time, it became clear that monetary policy, with its central tool of interest rate control, needed to be complemented by instruments and regulations to guarantee financial stability and security, which had to be applied at national, European and global levels. Thus, some regulations, on the solvency of financial institutions were approved, which were apparently stricter, such as the Basel III rules.  

Additional requirements were also approved for "global systemic institutions", as they play a more strategic role in the international financial system, including Credit Suisse (included in the list of the thirty most important institutions published by the Financial Stability Board at the end of 2022). But, in line with its recent difficulties, the severe deficiencies it had accumulated, which were in fact already known in the sector, have come to light. Stress tests were implemented for financial institutions to ensure that they were able to cope with shocks, but it only took one of the most foreseeable shocks —sooner or later interest rates would no longer be at historic lows— to push the portfolios of some institutions into losses, as it has happened to Silicon Valley Bank. 

Does this mean that the regulatory and supervisory mechanisms which had been theoretically strengthened after 2008 have not been effective? Not entirely: to a large extent, they have improved the health of the financial system. But they have not worked and have not been implemented with the required effectiveness, as seen in some recent cases, which are a resounding wake-up call. It is a matter of concern that all financial institutions with difficulties have some imprudent management behaviour, but also the inability of supervisory bodies to detect weaknesses in time. The difficulties of implementing effective supervisory mechanisms in a sector with major players and powerful interests have already been pointed out. And in 2009, the then chief economist of the International Monetary Fund, Olivier Blanchard, referred to the "dark corners" of the financial system, where hidden risks were accumulating (often under the guise of sophisticated financial products and strategies), which, when they surfaced, showed their full disruptive potential. More "light" needs to be shed on the potential "dark corners" that remain. 

Indeed, some poor practices, such as those now known about Credit Suisse, some management patterns that were not "proofed" against interest rate rises, remind us that we should not let our guard down, quite the contrary. There is a risk that other institutions have also developed what we might call an "addiction" to low interest rates, with business models that are only sustainable if abnormally low rates are perpetuated and which, to cover up their weaknesses or negligences, are now clamouring to ease the fight against inflation. The situation is complicated. On the one hand, it must be borne in mind that the asset with which the financial system works is not so much the money but trust, which must always be safeguarded. But we must add that, on the other hand, beyond the urgencies, the best guarantee of that trust is the professional and serious behaviour of the financial institutions, which requires delving into the necessary measures that were initiated in 2008, which now need to be updated and verified more effectively.